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INTERCOMPANY LOANS AND PROFIT SHIFTING 





This paper is concerned with tax-planning strategies of multinational corporations. A 
theoretical analysis discusses the choice of the capital structure in a setting where 
intercompany loans can be used to shift profits to low-tax countries. Empirical evidence is 
provided using micro-level panel data of virtually all German multinationals made available 
by the Bundesbank. This comprehensive dataset allows us to exploit differences in taxing 
conditions of almost eighty countries during a period of nine years. The empirical results 
confirm a robust impact of tax-rate differences within the multinational group on the use of 
intercompany loans, supporting the profit-shifting hypothesis. However, the implied tax-
revenue effects are rather small, suggesting that costs related to adjusting the capital structure 
for profit-shifting purposes are substantial. 
JEL Code: H25, F23, G32. 
Keywords: corporate taxation, multination corporations, tax planning, intercompany loans, 







Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the 






Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the 









February 2007 1 Introduction
Much of the discussion about international tax competition is centered around the impact
of taxes on multinational corporations' location and investment decisions (for surveys see
Hines, 1999, and de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). However, it is often neglected that there are
many more dimensions along which the multinational corporation can structure its activities
internationally, and that decisions related to production and trade are only part of the story.
From a taxation perspective, the fact that those corporations hold a±liates in di®erent
countries opens up many opportunities for tax planning with the aim to minimize their
overall tax burden. This might be quite important for the tax revenue from corporation
taxes and, furthermore, may signi¯cantly alter the way taxes a®ect location and investment
decisions and the business sector as a whole.
As is well noted in the literature (e.g., Hines and Rice, 1994, Gresik, 2001), a multinational
corporation has several ways to engage in tax planning other than choosing location and
level of investment. One important determinant of the tax burden is the transfer price
for goods and services traded within the corporation (for a theoretical discussion see e.g.,
Hau°er and Schjelderup, 2000; for empirical evidence see e.g., Swenson, 2001, Clausing,
2003). Apart from transfer pricing, multinationals have enhanced opportunities with respect
to tax planning as they can use external as well as internal funds in order to adjust their
capital structure. This allows multinationals not only to arbitrage more easily across di®erent
lending markets. It also opens up opportunities for tax planning by means of intercompany
loans. Borrowing from a±liates located in low-tax countries and lending to a±liates in high-
tax locations will allow the latter to deduct interest payments from pro¯ts and save taxes
(Mintz and Smart, 2004).
While several papers document some signi¯cant degree of pro¯t shifting of multinationals
(e.g., Grubert and Mutti, 1991, or Hines and Rice, 1994), the empirical literature so far does
not provide conclusive evidence that intercompany loans actually play an important role in
1this respect. Several papers show that the leverage of multinationals' a±liates is sensitive to
the tax rate in the host country (e.g., Jog and Tang, 2001, Mintz and Smart, 2004). However,
the tax shelter from debt gives rise to a tax-rate sensitivity of the leverage of any corporation,
including multinationals' a±liates as well as domestic corporations. For instance, Gordon
and Lee (2001) ¯nd a strong tax sensitivity of the leverage of US corporations.
Only some recent papers explicitly consider intercompany loans. Desai, Foley, and Hines
(2004a) analyze the capital structure of US multinationals and report a signi¯cant tax sen-
sitivity of both external and internal debt. Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) and Buettner
et al. (2006) con¯rm their ¯ndings for German multinationals. As the main result of Desai
et al. is that internal debt serves as a substitute to external debt, it is, however, not clear
whether the tax sensitivity of intercompany loans re°ects pro¯t shifting or the standard tax
shelter from debt. In fact, as shown by Mintz and Smart (2004), pro¯t shifting by means of
intercompany loans should not be sensitive to the local tax rate but to the tax-rate di®erence
between the lending and the borrowing a±liate within the multinational group.
This paper, therefore, studies how those tax-rate di®erences within the multinational group
a®ect the capital structure of multinationals and, in particular, the use of intercompany
loans. For this purpose we use a large micro-level panel database of virtually all German
multinationals made available for research by the German Bundesbank. This comprehensive
dataset allows us to exploit tax-rate di®erences in 79 countries, among those many low-tax
or tax-haven countries. For each a±liate within the multinational group the appropriate
tax-rate di®erence is calculated relative to the lowest tax rate observed among all a±liates.
The empirical results strongly support a signi¯cant impact of this tax-rate di®erential on
intercompany loans, implying that intercompany loans are indeed used to shift pro¯ts from
high- to low-tax countries. However, the implied tax revenue e®ects are rather small. This
¯nding is indicative for substantial costs of adjusting the capital structure for pro¯t-shifting
purposes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we model a corporation which is active at
2di®erent locations, including low-tax countries. The corporation is assumed to maximize
pro¯ts by optimally allocating internal funds with respect to di®erences in international
taxation. From the optimality conditions we obtain testable empirical implications, which
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 gives a short description of the dataset and discusses
the investigation approach. Section 5 provides descriptive statistics. The basic results are
presented in Section 6. Some further evidence showing how the results change with the share
of ownership is presented in Section 7. Section 8 provides our conclusion.
2 Theoretical Considerations
Consider a multinational group with a±liates at N locations. For simplicity, let us assume
that each location is situated in a di®erent country such that the tax system varies between



































ci (¸1i;:::;¸ji;:::;¸N;i;¹1i;:::;¹ji;:::;¹Ni)ki; with ¹ii = 0:
Let us brie°y discuss the components of this pro¯t function. The ¯rst line captures the
contribution of output, f(ki), taking account of the fact that a part of the corresponding
pro¯t is taxed away. The host country statutory tax rate is denoted with ¿i. The second
line shows the interest costs which, similarly, enter pro¯ts only after tax deduction. ij is
3the corresponding lending rate at location j. Note that this term captures also the interest
costs related to intercompany loans, provided the corporation raises a credit at country j
and transfers the money to the a±liate in country i such that ¸ji > 0. The third line is
also concerned with intercompany loans but reports the contribution of pure pro¯t shifting
where some ¯nancial capital is shifted from one location to the other, without increasing
outside debt. The fourth line reports the cost of capital ¯nanced with equity. The ¯fth line,
¯nally, captures cost of borrowing in addition to the market lending rate which are assumed
to increase with the various types of debt in the model.2;3 Note that the general speci¯cation
used here assumes that the additional cost of borrowing of a±liate i are increasing not only
in the share of capital ¯nanced with external debt ¸ji. In fact, the analysis follows Mintz
and Smart (2004) and assumes that the additional cost of borrowing will also increase in the
share ¯nanced with internal debt ¹ji as this also implies a decline in the equity share of the
lending a±liate. Note that the cost function is indexed with the host country to re°ect the
potential role of this country's credit-market regulations for the underlying con°ict between
debtors and creditors.4
2The additional cost of borrowing function is assumed to be convex. More speci¯cally, we assume
@ci
@¸ji > 0; @ci









3The corporate ¯nance literature (see Tirole, 2006, for an overview) justi¯es the existence of those addi-
tional cost of debt on several grounds. A ¯rst set of arguments refers to the possible cost of ¯nancial distress
including bankruptcy as well as agency costs related to the con°ict between debtors and creditors (e.g.,
Myers, 2001). Another strand of the literature (e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1989, and Hart, 1988), emphasizes
the role of agency costs between shareholders and management. From this perspective, some debt might be
useful to ensure control rights of investors in bad states, for instance, if a ¯rm goes bankrupt. But, since
equity allows the manager to control the corporation in good states, a tax-induced increase in the debt-asset
ratio relative to the optimal level would imply an ine±ciency which contributes to the additional cost of
borrowing.
4Note that increasing additional cost of intercompany loans would also arise if the host country imposes
restrictions on the use of intercompany loans for pro¯t shifting (see below).
4The optimality conditions are
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In the general case, the loan from a±liate j to a±liate i ¯nanced with a credit from country
j is, among other determinants, a function of the corresponding after-tax rate of interest
¸ji = gi ( r ¡ ij (1 ¡ ¿i);::: ) with
@gi
@ij (1 ¡ ¿i)
< 0: (1)
The loan from a±liate j to a±liate i ¯nanced with equity depends on the tax-rate di®erence
¹ji = hi ( ij (¿i ¡ ¿j);::: ) with
@hi
@ij (¿i ¡ ¿j)
> 0: (2)
If we impose somewhat more structure on the analysis, we can generate more speci¯c pre-
dictions:
A restrictive case is provided by Buettner et al. (2006), who are concerned with the leverage
of a single foreign a±liate held by a German parent. In this case, the fact that Germany is
a high-tax country makes it rather unlikely to observe a positive tax-rate di®erential that
gives an incentive to shift pro¯ts from foreign a±liates into Germany. Thus, with tj > ti, ¹ji
is zero, and all intercompany loans from j to i re°ect external debt for the lending a±liate.
Therefore, in this case, the leverage is determined by the corresponding after-tax cost of
interest according to Equation 1.
Mintz and Smart (2004) consider another case where all intercompany loans relate to pro¯t
shifting. In our approach this case is obtained if r < ij(1 ¡ ¿i) and, hence, ¸ji is zero. In
this case, the leverage is determined by the tax-rate di®erence between the a±liates located
5in i and j evaluated with the lending rate.
For our purposes let us consider a slightly more general case with a simpli¯ed cost function
where we aggregate among di®erent kinds of loans. If we assume that loans of the same kind












This cost function distinguishes three kinds of debt. As a consequence, the ¯rst-order condi-
tions for all intercompany loans of the same kind involve the same marginal cost. If interest
rates di®er, this implies that the leverage related to intercompany loans re¯nanced with
external capital
P
j6=i ¸ji, is determined by the local tax rate and the lowest lending rate
among all locations
¸ji > 0; where j = argmin
k
ik; and zero otherwise. (4)
With this condition, ¸ji follows from Equation 1. In contrast, the other kind of intercompany
loans
P
j6=i ¹ji, which are not re¯nanced externally, is determined by the largest tax-rate
di®erence evaluated at the lending rate
¹ji > 0; where j = argmax
k
ik (¿i ¡ ¿k); and zero otherwise. (5)
With this condition, the optimal level of ¹ji is determined by Equation 2.
3 Empirical Implications
The analysis below aims at testing the empirical implications of the above model. Basically,
our analysis is concerned with the implications of the ¯rst-order conditions and considers
the empirical determinants of the debt-asset ratio where we focus on intercompany loans.
6The debt-asset ratio Li of each a±liate i consists of three components










where the ¯rst component is the amount of debt directly raised from external creditors, the
second and third components together make up the amount of intercompany loans (ICLi).
The theory distinguishes intercompany loans re-¯nanced with external credit, which are used
to arbitrage across capital markets (¸ji), from loans not externally re-¯nanced (¹ji), which
are used to shift pro¯ts. However, this distinction is generally not observable empirically.
Instead, balance-sheet data, like those used in the current study, usually provide some ¯gures
for Li and ICLi.
Abstracting from possible di®erences in the lending rate, the optimality conditions for ¸ij
and ¹ij suggest that the share of capital of an a±liate ¯nanced with intercompany loans
should not only be a®ected by the local tax rate but also by a positive tax-rate di®erential
with regard to other locations where the multinational holds a±liates.5 As we have seen
above, the empirical implications of the theory depend on the function for the additional
cost of borrowing. Assuming that this cost function follows (3) such that intercompany loans
of the same kind but from di®erent locations are perfect substitutes, the share of capital of
an a±liate i held by corporation k ¯nanced with intercompany loans ICLi;k should be a
function of the local tax rate ¿i and the maximal tax-rate di®erence (¿i ¡ ¿min
k ) with regard
to all other a±liates in the multinational group (¿min
k is the lowest local tax rate among all
a±liates of the group as implied by Equation 5). In other words, the theory suggests not only
5We abstract from di®erences in the lending rate since our basic database does not provide corresponding
information and external data sources are not available for the large number of countries involved. In our
empirical analysis, however, we control for di®erences in the lending rate driven by country characteristics
such as country risk, creditor rights, and the size of the credit market by including country ¯xed e®ects.
Firm speci¯c di®erences in the lending rate are controlled by variables such as the turnover and by company-
and group-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects.
7to take account of the local tax rate faced by an a±liate in order to capture the traditional
tax shelter of debt ¯nance. Instead, we should also take account of the tax-rate di®erence
to the lowest tax rate among all a±liates of a multinational group as this determines the
potential tax savings from pro¯t shifting.
4 Data and Investigation Approach
A basic problem in the empirical analysis of the tax e®ects on corporate decisions is to
formulate an approach with su±cient empirical variation in the incentives generated by
the tax system. In the current study we utilize a micro-level panel dataset of German
multinationals which o®ers substantial variation in three dimensions:
1. A ¯rst dimension relates to the international perspective, as the dataset reports the
capital structure of each of the foreign a±liates of a multinational that operates in
various countries. While the database considers the multinational's activities globally,
the empirical analysis is based on a sample of 79 countries for which reliable information
with regard to corporate income taxation is available.
2. Another dimension that o®ers variation in the taxing conditions is the time dimension.
The panel data covers each multinational's activities as well as the taxing conditions
on an annual basis in the period from 1996 until 2004.
83. The third dimension is related to the heterogeneity of the a±liates that vary in the tax-
rate di®erence relative to the lowest level of the tax rate observed among all a±liates
in the group. Note that this type of variation refers to each individual a±liate in the
dataset.
In order to test the empirical implications as outlined in the previous section, we employ a
micro-level dataset for German multinationals (MiDi) provided by the Bundesbank. This
contains a comprehensive annual database of foreign direct investment positions of German
enterprizes held abroad. The data provides information about each foreign a±liate's balance
sheet and some further information about the ownership and about the German investor. In
its current version, ¯rm-level panel data for foreign a±liates are available for the period 1996
to 2004.6 Each German multinational has to report its foreign assets, including both directly
and indirectly held FDI, conditional on some lower threshold level for mandatory reporting.7
Basically, the estimation sample comprises balance-sheet information of virtually all German
outbound investments from 1996 to 2004, regardless of the legal form, of whether directly
or indirectly held, and of whether subsidiaries are wholly or only partly owned. While
the dataset reports the capital share of intercompany loans received by foreign a±liates,
comparable information is not available for the German parent. As a consequence, the focus
of our study is on the capital structure of foreign a±liates.
With regard to the lending part of intercompany loans, the dataset distinguishes intercom-
pany loans received from the parent as well as intercompany loans received from other foreign
a±liates.8 This allows us to restrict the focus of the empirical analysis even more closely
6Data collection is enforced by German law, which determines reporting mandates for international
transactions as part of the Law on Foreign Trade and Payments and corresponding regulations.
7Since 2002 FDI has to be reported if the participation is 10% or more and the balance-sheet total of the
foreign object is above 3 million euro. For details see Lipponer (2006). Though previous years showed lower
threshold levels, we apply this threshold level uniformly for all years in the panel.
8The corresponding position is \...liabilities to a±liated enterprizes ... outside of Germany" (see Lipponer,
2006).
9to intercompany loans granted as well as received by foreign a±liates, since, as Germany is
a high-tax country, there is little reason to expect German parents to issue intercompany
loans to their foreign a±liates for pro¯t-shifting purposes.
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the focus of the analysis by depicting a multina-
tional corporation with two foreign a±liates, where the parent as well as one of the a±liates
are located in high-tax countries but a third a±liate is located in a low-tax country.9 In
this setting, intercompany loans granted by the foreign a±liate in the low-tax country might
be used to shift pro¯ts into this country. While this might involve loans to the parent as
well as to the foreign a±liate in the high-tax country, as discussed above, the focus of the
current paper is only on the latter relationship, depicted by the vertical arrows in the ¯gure.
As a consequence, the empirical analysis is concerned with multinational corporations with
a±liates in more than one foreign country { binational corporations are excluded.
As we focus on intercompany loans granted as well as received by foreign a±liates, we
implicitly assume that the taxing conditions for these foreign a±liates are decisive for the
company group. This might be questioned in a context where the parent company would
have to pay taxes on worldwide pro¯ts, as in a regime of foreign tax credit. However,
note that for German multinationals as well as for most other European multinationals
the exemption principle applies. This could be di®erent in the U.S. case, where foreign
earnings are taxed subject to a foreign tax credit. However, recent literature argues that the
anti-abuse controlled foreign corporation (CFC) provisions are not e®ective (e.g., Mutti and
Grubert, 2006). Thus, tax planning of U.S. corporations might be similar.
Since taxing conditions vary in more than one dimension, we can further exploit the micro-
level structure of the dataset and explore the capital structure of multinationals using panel-
data techniques. Following our discussion of the empirical implications, the analysis is based
9The company structure can be, of course, much more complicated in the data. On average, we observe
about ¯ve foreign subsidiaries per multinational in our basic estimation sample.
10Figure 1: Intercompany Loans in a Stylized Multinational Group
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on regressions of the following type
ICLi;k;t = a1(¿i;t ¡ ¿
min
k;t ) + a2¿i;t + a3xi;k;t + 't + °k + "i;k;t; (7)
where (¿i;t ¡ ¿min
k;t ) is the a±liate-speci¯c tax-rate di®erence and ¿i;t is the statutory tax
rate applicable to a±liate i. The dependent variable, ICL, is de¯ned by the amount of
intercompany loans received by a foreign a±liate i from other foreign a±liates within the
multinational group k divided by total capital.
Note that the basic speci¯cation includes time e®ects, 't, possibly capturing di®erences in
the treatment of foreign earnings in the home country (Germany) of the multinational and
other aggregate shocks. The speci¯cation also takes account of a speci¯c e®ect for each multi-
national group, °k. This is important in the current context since group-speci¯c risk would
a®ect the lending rate and the additional cost of borrowing (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004a).
11Using group-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects also allows us to condition on the international structure
of each group. This is important since we exploit the di®erences in the group structure in
order to identify tax incentives but do not model the choice of the group structure. We
also employ a±liate-speci¯c control variables, xk;i;t, which capture some heterogeneity in the
borrowing costs across a±liates. Borrowing costs might also be related to country-speci¯c
conditions in the lending market such as bankruptcy laws, creditor rights, etc. This would
suggest to further include country-speci¯c e®ects. Finally, since borrowing costs may also
vary with the branch of the a±liate, sector-speci¯c e®ects could also be included.
5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides some information about the basic characteristics of the sample of multi-
nationals. Three di®erent samples are distinguished: the full sample comprises all foreign-
direct-investment observations available. A reduced sample excludes all binational corpora-
tions, where a structure as in Figure 1 cannot be observed, obviously, and considers only
a±liates where information about the local tax rate is available. Whereas we use information
from the second sample in order to compute the lowest tax rate within the group, the third
is the ultimate estimation sample where some further restrictions apply (see below).
The last two columns report the capital of all considered a±liates where a signi¯cant share
is held by the reporting multinational. Comparing the aggregate stock of capital in the ¯rst
and second sample, we see that, even if many countries are excluded, still between 80% and
90% of all reported capital is covered by the second sample. This is di®erent with the third
sample, which is the basic sample for the regression analysis below. This sample further
excludes a±liates with zero turnover. While this restriction implies a considerable decline
in the number of observations, the reason is to focus on the capital structure of productive
a±liates as in the above theoretical model.10
10Note, however, that our estimation results proved to be robust against the inclusion of a±liates with
12Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Sample Obs. Countries Capital (in bn. e) Share
1 all available observations 173,473 162 4,133.33 1
2 if tax data available &
excl. binational corp. 133,159 79 3,555.56 0.86
3 as in sample 2
excl. zero turnover 109,300 79 981.11 0.24
Capital consists of registered capital, capital reserves, pro¯t reserves, as well as internal and external
debt. The total capital ¯gure is an unweighted annual average for the period from 1996 to 2004. Sam-
ple 1 comprises all foreign direct investment observations (outbound investment), Sample 2 employs
all a±liates where corporate tax rate information is available and excludes binational corporations,
Sample 3 further excludes all observations with zero turnover.
As has been discussed above, we employ a±liate- and group-speci¯c indicators of the tax
incentives for pro¯t shifting. More speci¯cally, we proceed in two steps. First, we determine
for each multinational the lowest corporate income-tax rate observed among all of its foreign
a±liates based on Sample 2. (For ease of exposition we will refer to the corresponding
a±liate as the lowest-tax a±liate.) In a second step, we use this group-speci¯c minimum tax
rate as the benchmark for the group and compute the tax-rate di®erential of the local tax
rate to this benchmark for each of the a±liates. As a consequence, high-tax a±liates will
show large positive tax-rate di®erentials, whereas the tax-rate di®erential for the lowest-tax
a±liate is zero.
Let us emphasize once more that the tax-rate di®erential with regard to the lowest-tax a±li-
ate is not determined on basis of the estimation sample but on basis of the more comprehen-
sive Sample 2 of Table 1. In other words, while we focus on the ¯nances of the productive
entities of multinational corporations, we take into account in a much more comprehen-
sive way the incentives for pro¯t shifting and include the incentives for using intercompany
loans in order to shift pro¯ts to foreign a±liates, including purely non-productive tax-haven
zero turnover.
13a±liates.
Table 2 provides some information about which countries typically host the lowest-tax a±l-
iates. The second column lists the number of all a±liates reported in each of the countries.
The third column, denoted with ¢¿ = 0, lists all observations where the respective country
hosts the lowest-tax a±liate. While we see that most a±liates are reported in the U.S., in
the U.K., and in France, the lowest-tax a±liate is quite often found in Switzerland, Hungary,
Poland, and Austria.
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis. While the
tax-rate variable is measured at the level of the country, all other variables including the
tax-rate di®erential vary by a±liate. A ¯rst impression of the relative importance of debt as
a means of pro¯t shifting as compared to the standard tax shelter from debt is given by the
three di®erent borrowing variables. While the total leverage is almost 60%, intercompany
loans make up only a capital share of 24.2%. This ¯gure still includes intercompany loans
from the German parent to foreign a±liates which, given Germany's high tax rate, is quite
unlikely related to pro¯t shifting. Intercompany loans received from other foreign a±liates
amount only to an average capital share of 10.6%.
Table 4 provides further descriptive evidence for the impact of taxes on intercompany loans.
It displays the share of capital ¯nanced with di®erent kinds of debt for the basic sample
as well as for various sub-samples. For ease of comparison, column (1) repeats the mean
values as reported above. Columns (2) and (3) report the share of intercompany loans
observed among the a±liates of those multinational corporations which hold at least one
a±liate in a low-tax country. Column (2) de¯nes the low-tax country as a country with
a tax rate below the 10% percentile of the tax-rate distribution, column (3) uses the even
stricter de¯nition based on the 5% percentile of the tax-rate distribution. If corporations
use intercompany loans for pro¯t shifting, we should expect the mean to be higher for those
multinational corporations. In fact, the capital share of intercompany loans (excluding those
obtained from the German parent) is higher by about 30 to 40%, indicating that the use of
14Table 2: Geographical Distribution of A±liates
Country obs. ¢¿ = 0 ¿ Country obs. ¢¿ = 0 ¿
Albania 6 0 .273 Korea (Republic of) 1,045 198 .301
Argentina 774 54 .346 Latvia 132 53 .229
Australia 2,384 190 .338 Lithuania 134 75 .232
Austria 7,356 1,326 .340 Luxembourg 1,910 349 .356
Bahamas 16 16 .000 Malaysia 878 197 .283
Bangladesh 42 0 .350 Malta 79 11 .350
Belgium 4,058 233 .388 Mexico 1,576 76 .343
Belize 0 0 .279 Netherlands 7,268 946 .348
Bermuda 187 187 .000 New Zealand 385 11 .330
Bolivia 23 1 .250 Norway 1,026 273 .280
Brazil 2,767 617 .321 Pakistan 123 7 .347
Bulgaria 250 66 .293 Panama 78 0 .353
Canada 2,176 75 .418 Papua New Guinea 0 0 .263
Cayman Islands 490 490 .000 Paraguay 33 12 .300
Chile 474 261 .157 Peru 160 11 .297
China 2,944 260 .330 Philippines 300 16 .328
Columbia 275 2 .350 Poland 4,482 1,828 .311
Costa Rica 55 4 .307 Portugal 1,688 355 .321
Croatia 353 81 .265 Romania 500 126 .308
Cyprus 323 72 .228 Russia 932 258 .301
Czech Republic 4,137 947 .333 Serbia&Montenegro 0 0 .193
Denmark 1,821 279 .318 Singapore 1,928 516 .250
Dominican Republic 51 10 .250 Slovak Republic 968 280 .319
Ecuador 99 10 .322 Slovenia 333 113 .250
El Salvador 36 7 .250 South Africa 1,177 34 .397
Estonia 127 116 .116 Spain 6,598 254 .395
Fiji 0 0 .336 Sri Lanka 49 11 .359
Finland 759 96 .286 Sweden 2,357 666 .280
France 11,473 880 .372 Switzerland 6,922 4,339 .246
Greece 831 63 .350 Taiwan 545 81 .250
Honduras 23 7 .284 Thailand 502 75 .300
Hong Kong 1,840 1,173 .163 Turkey 1,020 66 .367
Hungary 3,126 2,199 .178 Turks&Caicos Isl. 0 0 .000
Iceland 13 1 .267 UK 11,425 3,560 .308
India 951 45 .364 Ukraine 197 19 .290
Indonesia 429 67 .300 Uruguay 143 34 .311
Ireland 1,546 1,271 .106 USA 14,376 1,599 .412
Israel 160 7 .360 Venezuela 255 27 .340
Italy 6,887 254 .405 Vietnam 65 1 .294
Japan 2,317 15 .457 Total 133,159 27,854 .288
obs.: total number of a±liates (pooled in the period from 1996 until 2004); ¢¿ = 0: number of a±liates
with a tax-rate di®erence equal to zero, i.e number of observations identi¯ed as low-tax a±liates; ¿: average
host country statutory tax rate.
15Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Statutory tax rate .334 .073 0 .532
Tax-rate di®. within comp. group .124 .106 0 .532
Total leverage .588 .272 0 1
Intercompany loans
{ total .242 .251 0 1
{ excluding loans
{ from German parent (ICL) .106 .197 0 1
Loss carry-forward .310 .463 0 1
Majority-owned a±liate .158 .365 0 1
Wholly-owned a±liate .721 .449 0 1
ln(Turnover) 9.79 1.40 a) a)
Panel comprises 9 years, 109,300 observations. Tax-rate di®erential is the di®er-
ence between the statutory tax rate at the a±liate's location and the minimum
tax rate within the multinational group. a) con¯dential data.




a±liate in a low-tax country
lowest-tax
a±liates
10%-percentile 5%-percentile ¢¿ = 0
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total leverage .588 .570 .547 .576
External debt .346 .312 .313 .366
Intercompany loans
{ total .242 .259 .234 .210
{ excluding loans
{ from German parent .106 .138 .149 .077
Observations 109,300 38,400 16,061 22,908
10 % percentile (5%-percentile): all groups with an a±liate located in one of the low-tax countries,
where a low-tax country is de¯ned as a country with a statutory tax rate below the 10% (5%) percentile;
¢¿ = 0 refers to all those foreign a±liates with the lowest tax rate within the group.
16intercompany loans is much more prevalent among multinationals with a±liates in low-tax
countries. Conversely, the a±liate experiencing the lowest tax rate within the group should
display a much lower capital share of intercompany loans. As reported in column (4), the
mean capital share for those a±liates is lower by about 25%. This con¯rms the theoretical
view, as there should be little incentive to shift pro¯ts out of those countries.
6 Basic Results
Table 5 reports basic regression results following Equation 7. In order to control for group-
speci¯c risks, all estimations employ ¯xed e®ects for the company group. Moreover, time
dummies are included in order to capture di®erences in the taxation of the parent. Given
the limited information in the balance sheet of the a±liates, only two direct control variables
are included. Since the e®ective tax reduction from using debt might be zero if an a±liate
carries forward any losses for tax purposes (see MacKie-Mason, 1990), we include a variable
indicating whether some loss carry-forward is reported. Some speci¯cations will also include
the turnover of the a±liate, since a larger cash-°ow might be associated with less credit-
market constraints and, hence, might facilitate access to external credits.
Throughout the di®erent speci¯cations, the tax-rate di®erential shows a signi¯cantly positive
e®ect, whereas the host-country tax rate proves insigni¯cant. This con¯rms the theoretical
prediction in the sense that corporations use intercompany loans to shift pro¯ts. At the
same time, the insigni¯cance of the tax rate indicates that the intercompany loans between
foreign a±liates do not play an important role in minimizing the cost of capital by engaging
in arbitrage across lending conditions of a±liate locations. Given the magnitude of this
other type of intercompany loans, this function might well be carried out by loans from the
German parent (cf. Table 3).






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18control for a loss-carry forward as the incentive to save taxes is reduced in this case. The
positive sign possibly re°ects the desire of shareholders to get more control of an a±liate's
management if the performance is weak. It might also simply re°ect the substitutive rela-
tionship to external debt (Desai et al., 2004a). This could also explain the negative sign for
turnover which is taken into account in column (5). The speci¯cations in columns (6) to (9)
additionally employ industry-level dummies following a classi¯cation of a±liates according
to 71 industries. This might help to further control for di®erences in the ¯nancial risk related
to an a±liate's activities. Columns (8) and (9), ¯nally, use controls for the host country in
order to make sure that no country-speci¯c characteristics are driving the results. While the
results prove to be robust, some part of the variation is swallowed up by the country-speci¯c
dummies. Hence, we would consider column (7) of Table 5 as the preferred speci¯cation.
Since in many cases the amount of intercompany loans received by an a±liate is zero, Table 6
reports results where those observations are excluded. However, the results show only minor
di®erences.
Quantitatively, we see from the preferred speci¯cation (7) of Table 5 that a ten percent-
age point increase in the tax-rate di®erence to the group-speci¯c lowest-tax a±liate leads
to an approximately 0.68 percentage point higher internal-debt ratio. Expressed as a semi-
elasticity, a tax-rate di®erence by ten percentage points triggers a response in the correspond-
ing capital share by 6.4 percent. This ¯gure is not much di®erent from existing estimates
of the tax-rate sensitivity of debt. Corresponding calculations based on the estimates by
Desai et al. (2004a) yield a semi-elasticity of 10.2% (5.5%) for the sensitivity of an a±liate's
capital share of internal (external) debt. The ¯ndings of Buettner et al. (2006) suggest a
corresponding semi-elasticity of 6.2% (5.1%).
In order to get an impression of the magnitude of the e®ect on the tax base, consider the
case of an a±liate i with a stock of capital of $1 million. Suppose (pre-tax) pro¯ts are
$200,000. From the mean value of the leverage we would expect the a±liate to receive an




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Deduction of interest costs reduces the tax base by $21,200, or 10.6%. Suppose now that the
corporation opens up a tax-haven a±liate j, where the corporation tax equals zero. Then,
assuming a±liate i's previous tax-rate di®erence is equal to the sample mean (12.4%) and
the statutory tax rate in country i is also equal to the mean (33.4%), the tax-rate di®erence
increases by 21 percentage points (33.4%{12.4%). Our estimate suggests that in this case the
intercompany loan would be increased by $14,280 (0.068£0.21£$1,000,000). Consequently,
the a±liate i's tax base further declines by $2,856, or 1.6%.
Consider another example, where we observe a tax reform in the host country of a±liate i.
Let us assume that the tax rate declines by ten percentage points and, thus, that also the
tax-rate di®erential declines by ten percentage points. Then, the intercompany loan would
decrease by $6,800 (0.068£0.1£$1,000,000). In this case, under the above assumptions,
a±liate i's tax base increases by $1,360, or 0.8%.
7 Results for Di®erent Shares of Ownership
The rather small revenue e®ects might indicate that there are some important costs or re-
strictions which prevent corporations from using pro¯t-shifting loans more aggressively. For
instance, host countries might enact speci¯c policies which restrict the use of intercompany
loans. However, it is di±cult to quantify the role of those restrictions. In fact, it proved
impossible to augment the current analysis based on almost 80 countries with informa-
tion about the existence and nature of corresponding rules such as thin-capitalization or
earnings-stripping rules. But, there might be other reasons why ¯rms experience high costs
in adjusting the capital structure. While additional costs of using intercompany loans are
basically not observed in the dataset, some of their potential determinants are. Desai et.al
(2004b) argue that shared ownership of foreign a±liates is associated with coordination costs
which impede tax e±cient structuring of worldwide operations. This view is supported by
Mintz and Weichenrieder (2006) who ¯nd a higher tax-rate sensitivity of intercompany loans
21for wholly-owned subsidiaries. In terms of the above theoretical framework, this could imply
that the additional costs related to intercompany loans are lower and exhibit a smaller gra-
dient when the ownership share is higher. Thus, we might expect to ¯nd that intercompany
loans are used more if the ownership share is higher. We might also expect to ¯nd that
the sensitivity of intercompany loans to the tax-rate di®erential with regard to the lowest-
tax a±liate is increased when taking into account only majority holdings or wholly-owned
subsidiaries.
In order to test for di®erences in the sensitivity of intercompany loans to pro¯t-shifting op-
portunities captured by the tax-rate di®erential, we augment the above estimation approach
(7) by interaction terms with dummies capturing the ownership share.11
Table 7 shows results for our basic sample. For ease of comparison, the ¯rst column re-
peats the basic result as displayed in column (7) of Table 5. Column (2) reports results
where we augment the basic approach with dummy variables for the ownership share. Both
dummy variables are highly signi¯cant, pointing at an increased use of intercompany loans
by majority- and wholly-owned subsidiaries. Note that the de¯nition of majority-owned
subsidiaries does not include wholly-owned subsidiaries. Thus, the results indicate that
wholly-owned (partly-owned) subsidiaries show an about 5 (2) percentage points higher cap-
ital share of intercompany loans than a±liates without a majority participation.
Column (3) reports results where also the tax-rate di®erential is interacted with the two
dummy variables for the ownership share. The results support signi¯cant di®erences in the
tax-rate sensitivity. While the sensitivity with regard to the tax-rate di®erential shows a
negative e®ect for minority participation, a positive e®ect is supported for majority-owned
subsidiaries. The tax rate sensitivity for wholly-owned subsidiaries, however, is substantially
higher. Adding up coe±cients we ¯nd that the coe±cient of the tax-rate di®erential is about
11Dummies are preferred against a continuous interaction term for the ownership share since the dis-
tribution of the ownership share shows strong concentration at the 51% and 100% thresholds. However,
qualitatively, the results of corresponding estimates show no di®erences.
22Table 7: Intercompany Loans and Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax-rate di®. within comp. group .068 ?? .065 ?? -.099 ?? -.110 ?? -.105 ??
(.018) (.018) (.022) (.022) (.022)
Tax-rate di®.£majority owned .114 ?? .117 ?? .127 ??
(.020) (.023) (.023)
Tax-rate di®.£wholly owned .203 ?? .220 ?? .208 ??
(.018) (.020) (.020)
Statutory tax rate -.004 .007 .005 .028 .006
(.025) (.024) (.023) (.030) (.037)
Statutory tax rate£majority owned .026 .010
(.033) (.033)
Statutory tax rate£wholly owned -.038 -.052
(.035) (.033)
(ln)Turnover -.001 -.001 -.001 .001 -.003 ??
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
(ln)Turnover£majority owned -.005 ?? -.005 ??
(.002) (.001)
(ln)Turnover£wholly owned -.002 -.002
(.001) (.001)
Majority owned (share ¸ 51%) .020 ?? .003 .047 ?? .052 ??
(.002) (.003) (.018) (.018)
Wholly owned (share = 100%) .051 ?? .022 ?? .049 ?? .049 ??
(.002) (.003) (.018) (.018)
Loss carry-forward .033 ?? .034 ?? .031 ?? .031 ?? .031 ??
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002)
R-squared .032 .040 .042 .042 .057
Industry e®ects yes yes yes yes yes
Host-country e®ects no no no no yes
Dependent variable: share of internal debt related to loans from other, non-German a±liates. Robust
standard errors allowing for country-year cluster e®ects in parentheses. An asterisk denotes signi¯cance
at 10% level, two asterisks denote 5%. 109,300 observations, 4,215 ¯rms. All estimates include a full set
of group-level and time ¯xed e®ects.
230.104 for wholly-owned subsidiaries. This indicates that a ten percentage point increase in
the tax-rate di®erence with regard to the lowest-tax a±liate leads to an approximately 1
percentage point higher internal-debt ratio. Expressed as a semi-elasticity evaluated at the
mean capital share for wholly-owned subsidiaries (0.120), a tax-rate change by ten percentage
points triggers a response in the corresponding debt ratio by about 8.7 percent.
From the theoretical discussion we know, however, that the additional cost function may
a®ect not only the sensitivity with regard to the tax-rate di®erential but also the sensitivity
with regard to all other indicators of the relative cost of equity and intercompany loans.
Therefore, columns (4) and (5) report results where the other determinants are interacted
with the ownership-share dummy variables as well. However, some of these interaction terms
are insigni¯cant and the results on the sensitivity with regard to the tax-rate di®erential prove
to be robust.
In order to get an impression of how much the magnitude of the e®ect on the tax base is
increased with wholly-owned subsidiaries, let us again consider a case of a subsidiary with
a stock of capital of $1 million. From the mean leverage for wholly-owned corporations, we
would expect such a subsidiary to receive an intercompany loan of about $120,000. At a
lending rate of 20%, deduction of interest costs reduces the tax base by $24,000, or 12%.
Suppose now that the tax rate, and, therefore, the tax-rate di®erence, is decreased by 10
percentage points. Our preferred estimate of column (3) suggests that, in this case, the
intercompany loan would be reduced by $10,400 (0.104£0.1£$1,000,000). Consequently, the
tax base in the high-tax country would increase by $2,080, or 1.2 %. Although this is a
stronger e®ect than the one obtained for the whole sample, it still appears to be rather
small.
248 Conclusion
We have set up a model of a multinational corporation which uses intercompany loans for
two purposes. The ¯rst is to minimize cost of capital by making use of external credit and
engaging in arbitrage across a±liate locations. The second is to shift pro¯ts to low-tax ju-
risdictions. The theoretical analysis shows that the ¯rst purpose suggests that the use of
intercompany loans will be a®ected by the local tax rate. The second purpose, however,
causes intercompany loans to depend on the tax-rate di®erences between the lending and
the borrowing companies within the multinational group. Only this latter relationship is
indicative of pro¯t shifting. Therefore, existing empirical evidence on the tax-rate sensi-
tivity of debt even if related to multinationals and intercompany loans does not reveal the
importance of pro¯t-shifting activities.
Our empirical investigation studies whether the tax-rate di®erences within a multinational
group will help to predict intercompany loans. The analysis makes use of a large micro-
level panel dataset of virtually all German multinationals made available for research by
the Bundesbank. This comprehensive dataset allows us to exploit di®erences in the taxing
conditions in 79 countries, including many low-tax countries, in a period of nine years. For
each a±liate within the multinational group, we calculate the appropriate tax-rate di®erence
relative to the lowest tax rate observed among all foreign a±liates.
The empirical results con¯rm a robust signi¯cant impact of tax-rate di®erences within the
multinational group on the use of intercompany loans, supporting the pro¯t-shifting hypoth-
esis. Nevertheless, our ¯ndings suggest that the implied magnitude of tax-revenue losses
is rather modest even for wholly-owned ¯rms. To conclude, our ¯ndings are indicative for
substantial costs of adjusting the capital structure for means of pro¯t shifting. As a conse-
quence, if pro¯t-shifting is important as the literature suggests, multinationals seem to take
resort to alternative strategies of tax-planning. This would imply that further restrictions
imposed by tax policy on the capital structure of multinationals would not substantially
curb pro¯t-shifting.
25Datasources and De¯nitions
Firm-level data are taken from the micro-level dataset of the Bundesbank, see Lipponer
(2006) for an overview. The dependent variable, ICL, is determined by a balance-sheet
position capturing liabilities of foreign a±liates to other foreign a±liates within the
multinational group divided by the total stock of capital. The latter is de¯ned as
the sum of registered capital, capital reserves, pro¯t reserves, as well as internal and
external debt.
Corporate taxation data are taken from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documenta-
tion, and from surveys provided by the tax advisory companies Ernst&Young, PwC,
and KPMG. The statutory tax rate variable contains statutory pro¯t-tax rates mod-
i¯ed by applicable restrictions on interest deductions. The data covers a group of 79
countries in a period of nine years from 1996 until 2004.
References
Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1989): The ¯nancial structure of the ¯rm and the problem of
control, European Economic Review 33, 286 { 293.
Buettner, T., M. Overesch, U. Schreiber, and G. Wamser (2006): Taxation and the choice of
capital structure - Evidence from a panel of German multinationals, CESifo Working
Paper 1841, Munich.
Clausing, K.A. (2003): Tax-motivated transfer pricing and US intra¯rm trade, Journal of
Public Economics 87, 2207 { 2223.
De Mooij, R. and S. Ederveen (2003): Taxation and foreign direct investment: a synthesis
of empirical research, International Tax and Public Finance 10, 673 { 693.
26Desai, M.A., C.F. Foley, and J.R. Hines (2004a): A multinational perspective on capital
structure choice and internal capital markets, Journal of Finance 59, 2451 { 2487.
Desai, M.A., C.F. Foley, and J.R. Hines (2004b): The costs of shared ownership: Evidence
from international joint ventures, Journal of Financial Economics 73(2), 323 { 374.
Gresik, T. A. (2001): The taxing task of taxing transnationals, Journal of Economic Lit-
erature 39, 800 { 838.
Grubert, H. and J. Mutti (1991): Taxes, tari®s and transfer pricing in multinational cor-
porate decision making, The Review of Economics and Statistics 73, 285 { 293.
Gordon, R.H. and Y. Lee (2001): Do taxes a®ect corporate debt policy? Evidence from
U.S. corporate tax return data, Journal of Public Economics 82, 195 { 224.
Hart, O. D. (1988): Capital structure as a control mechanism in corporations, Canadian
Journal of Economics 21, 467 { 476.
Hau°er, A. and G. Schjelderup (2000): Corporate tax systems and cross country pro¯t
shifting, Oxford Economic Papers 52, 306 { 325.
Hines, J.R. (1999): Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation, National
Tax Journal 52, 305 { 322.
Hines, J.R. and E.M. Rice (1994): Fiscal paradise: foreign tax havens and American busi-
ness, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 149 { 182.
Jog, V. and J. Tang (2001): Tax reforms, debt shifting and tax revenues: multinational
corporations in Canada, International Tax and Public Finance 8, 5 { 26.
Lipponer, A. (2006): Microdatabase Direct Investment - MiDi. A brief guide, Bundesbank
Working Paper, Frankfurt.
MacKie-Mason, J. (1990): Do taxes a®ect corporate ¯nancing decisions? The Journal of
Finance 45, 1471 { 1493.
27Mintz, J. and M. Smart (2004): Income Shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory
and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada, Journal of Public Economics 88,
1149 { 1168.
Mintz, J. and A.J. Weichenrieder (2005): Taxation and the ¯nancial structure of German
outbound FDI, CESifo Working Paper 1612, Munich.
Mutti, J. and H. Grubert (2006): New Developments in the E®ects of Taxes on Royalties
and the Migration of Intangible Assets, Paper prepared for a NBER/CRIW Conference,
Washington, D.C.
Myers, S. (2001): Capital Structures, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 81 { 102.
Swenson, D.L. (2001): Tax reforms and evidence of transfer pricing, National Tax Journal
54, 7 { 25.
Tirole, J. (2006): The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton.
28CESifo Working Paper Series 




1896 Theo S. Eicher and Oliver Roehn, Sources of the German Productivity Demise – 
Tracing the Effects of Industry-Level ICT Investment, January 2007 
 
1897 Helge Berger, Volker Nitsch and Tonny Lybek, Central Bank Boards around the World: 
Why does Membership Size Differ?, January 2007 
 
1898 Gabriel Felbermayr and Wilhelm Kohler, Does WTO Membership Make a Difference at 
the Extensive Margin of World Trade?, January 2007 
 
1899 Benno Torgler and Friedrich Schneider, The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional 
Quality on the Shadow Economy, January 2007 
 
1900 Tomer Blumkin and Efraim Sadka, On the Desirability of Taxing Charitable 
Contributions, January 2007 
 
1901 Frederick van der Ploeg and Reinhilde Veugelers, Higher Education Reform and the 
Renewed Lisbon Strategy: Role of Member States and the European Commission, 
January 2007 
 
1902 John Lewis, Hitting and Hoping? Meeting the Exchange Rate and Inflation Criteria 
during a Period of Nominal Convergence, January 2007 
 
1903 Torben M. Andersen, The Scandinavian Model – Prospects and Challenges, January 
2007 
 
1904 Stephane Dees, Sean Holly, M. Hashem Pesaran and L. Vanessa Smith, Long Run 
Macroeconomic Relations in the Global Economy, January 2007 
 
1905 Richard Jong-A-Pin and Jakob De Haan, Political Regime Change, Economic Reform 
and Growth Accelerations, January 2007 
 
1906 Sascha O. Becker and Peter H. Egger, Endogenous Product versus Process Innovation 
and a Firm’s Propensity to Export, February 2007 
 
1907 Theo S. Eicher, Chris Papageorgiou and Oliver Roehn, Unraveling the Fortunates of the 
Fortunate: An Iterative Bayesian Model Averaging (IBMA) Approach, February 2007 
 
1908 Liliana E. Pezzin, Robert A. Pollak and Barbara S. Schone, Efficiency in Family 
Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and 
Disabled Elderly Parents, February 2007 
 
1909 Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, Self-Selection and Advice in Venture 
Capital Finance, February 2007 
 
  
1910 Rune Jansen Hagen and Gaute Torsvik, Irreversible Investments, Dynamic 
Inconsistency and Policy Convergence, February 2007 
 
1911 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann, The Role of School Improvement in 
Economic Development, February 2007 
 
1912 Bernard M. S. van Praag, Perspectives from the Happiness Literature and the Role of 
New Instruments for Policy Analysis, February 2007 
 
1913 Volker Grossmann and Thomas M. Steger, Growth, Development, and Technological 
Change, February 2007 
 
1914 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Human Capital and the Feldstein-Horioka 
Puzzle, February 2007 
 
1915 Oliver Roehn, Theo S. Eicher and Thomas Strobel, The Ifo Industry Growth 
Accounting Database, February 2007 
 
1916 Ian Babetskii, Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States, 
February 2007 
 
1917 Burkhard Heer, Alfred Maussner and Paul D. McNelis, The Money-Age Distribution: 
Empirical Facts and Limited Monetary Models, February 2007 
 
1918 Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn and Eijii Fujii, The Overvaluation of Renminbi 
Undervaluation, February 2007 
 
1919 Jim Malley, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Ulrich Woitek, To React or Not? Fiscal 
Policy, Volatility and Welfare in the EU-3, February 2007 
 
1920 Mattias Polborn, Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision, February 
2007 
 
1921 Lars P. Feld and Benno Torgler, Tax Morale after the Reunification of Germany: 
Results from a Quasi-Natural Experiment, February 2007 
 
1922 Robert S. Chirinko and Huntley Schaller, Fundamentals, Misvaluation, and Investment: 
The Real Story, February 2007 
 
1923 Benno Torgler and Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance 
and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis, February 2007 
 
1924 Adrian Pagan and M. Hashem Pesaran, On Econometric Analysis of Structural Systems 
with Permanent and Transitory Shocks and Exogenous Variables, February 2007 
 
1925 Hans-Werner Sinn, The Welfare State and the Forces of Globalization, February 2007 
 
1926 Michael Smart, Raising Taxes through Equalization, February 2007 
 
  
1927 Øystein Foros, Kåre P. Hagen and Hans Jarle Kind, Price-Dependent Profit Sharing as 
an Escape from the Bertrand Paradox, February 2007 
 
1928 Balázs Égert, Kirsten Lommatzsch and Amina Lahrèche-Révil, Real Exchange Rates in 
Small Open OECD and Transition Economies: Comparing Apples with Oranges?, 
February 2007 
 
1929 Aleksander Berentsen and Cyril Monnet, Monetary Policy in a Channel System, 
February 2007 
 
1930 Wolfgang Ochel, The Free Movement of Inactive Citizens in the EU – A Challenge for 
the European Welfare State?, February 2007 
 
1931 James K. Hammitt and Nicolas Treich, Statistical vs. Identified Lives in Benefit-Cost 
Analysis, February 2007 
 
1932 Wilhelm Kohler, The Bazaar Effect, Unbundling of Comparative Advantage, and 
Migration, February 2007 
 
1933 Karsten Staehr, Fiscal Policies and Business Cycles in an Enlarged Euro Area, February 
2007 
 
1934 Michele Bernasconi and Paola Profeta, Redistribution or Education? The Political 
Economy of the Social Race, March 2007 
 
1935 Axel Dreher, Martin Gassebner and Lars-H. R. Siemers, Does Terror Threaten Human 
Rights? Evidence from Panel Data, March 2007 
 
1936 Naércio Aquino Menezes Filho and Marc-Andreas Muendler, Labor Reallocation in 
Response to Trade Reform, March 2007 
 
1937 Gebhard Flaig and Timo Wollmershaeuser, Does the Euro-zone Diverge? A Stress 
Indicator for Analyzing Trends and Cycles in Real GDP and Inflation, March 2007 
 
1938 Michael Funke and Michael Paetz, Environmental Policy Under Model Uncertainty: A 
Robust Optimal Control Approach, March 2007 
 
1939 Byeongchan Seong, Sung K. Ahn and Peter A. Zadrozny, Cointegration Analysis with 
Mixed-Frequency Data, March 2007 
 
1940 Monika Bütler and Michel André Maréchal, Framing Effects in Political Decision 
Making: Evidence from a Natural Voting Experiment, March 2007 
 
1941 Giacomo Corneo and Olivier Jeanne, A Theory of Tolerance, March 2007 
 
1942 Qing Hong and Michael Smart, In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning and 
Foreign Direct Investment, March 2007 
 
1943 Yin-Wong Cheung, Dickson Tam and Matthew S. Yiu, Does the Chinese Interest Rate 
Follow the US Interest Rate?, March 2007  
1944 Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks, Unemployment and Gang Crime: Could Prosperity 
Backfire?, March 2007 
 
1945 Burkhard Heer, On the Modeling of the Income Distribution Business Cycle Dynamics, 
March 2007 
 
1946 Christoph A. Schaltegger and Lars P. Feld, Are Fiscal Adjustments less Successful in 
Decentralized Governments?, March 2007 
 
1947 Giovanni Facchini, Marcelo Olarreaga, Peri Silva and Gerald Willmann, Substitutability 
and Protectionism: Latin America’s Trade Policy and Imports from China and India, 
March 2007 
 
1948 C. Mirjam van Praag and Bernard M. S. van Praag, The Benefits of Being Economics 
Professor A (and not Z), March 2007 
 
1949 Astrid Hopfensitz and Frans van Winden, Dynamic Choice, Independence and 
Emotions, March 2007 
 
1950 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, A Multivariate Long-Memory Model 
with Structural Breaks, March 2007 
 
1951 Mattias Ganslandt and Keith E. Maskus, Wholesale Price Discrimination and Parallel 
Imports, March 2007 
 
1952 Michela Redoano, Fiscal Interactions Among European Countries. Does the EU 
Matter?, March 2007 
 
1953 Stefan C. Wolter, Rémy Hübschi and Matthias Müller, Push or Pull? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Demand for Individual Project Grants from the Swiss National Science 
Foundation, March 2007 
 
1954 Scott Alan Carson, African-American and White Inequality in the American South: 
Evidence from the 19
th Century Missouri State Prison, March 2007 
 
1955 Peter Egger, Marko Koethenbuerger and Michael Smart, Do Fiscal Transfers Alleviate 
Business Tax Competition? Evidence from Germany, March 2007 
 
1956 Panu Poutvaara and Lars-H. R. Siemers, Smoking and Social Interaction, March 2007 
 
1957 Stephan Danninger and Fred Joutz, What Explains Germany’s Rebounding Export 
Market Share?, March 2007 
 
1958 Stefan Krasa and Mattias Polborn, Majority-efficiency and Competition-efficiency in a 
Binary Policy Model, March 2007 
 
1959 Thiess Buettner and Georg Wamser, Intercompany Loans and Profit Shifting – 
Evidence from Company-Level Data, March 2007 